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We study how multiple firms voluntarily design inter-firm mechanisms to manage industry-level sys-
temic uncertainty. Facing a threat of systemic uncertainty that cannot be addressed by any one firm, we
explain how the Australian cotton industry mobilised hybrids and boundary spanners to develop an
industry-level solution at the inter-firm level. We apply resource dependence theory to extend Miller,
Kurunm€aki and O'Leary (2008), and identify a broader range of hybrid characteristics (novel, inter-firm,
public/private and open source) than currently acknowledged in accounting studies. We use these
characteristics to explain how hybrid organisational forms and hybrid control processes operate at the
inter-firm level to develop and share a solution to systemic uncertainty, which are subsequently applied
at the firm-level. Our findings also show how boundary spanners can operate with less tension in larger
industry-level collaborations, explained using our resource dependence conceptualisation. This responds
to Dekker's (2016) calls for more inter-firm research clarifying how controls operate beyond the firm.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
We study how multiple firms voluntarily design inter-firm
mechanisms to manage systemic uncertainty1 at an industry-
level. Many global challenges (e.g., the threat of pests, climate
change, water quality and biodiversity) are complex (IPCC, 2014;
Uetake, 2015) and create systemic uncertainty with similar effects
across multiple firms within an industry (Tashman & Rivera, 2016).
The management of systemic uncertainty requires coordinated
actions across firms affected (Adger, 2010; Albino, Dangelico, &
Pontrandolfo, 2012; Bebbington & Thomson, 2013; Chesbrough &
Appleyard, 2007), with a single firm unable to tackle the effects
of systemic uncertainty on their own (Tashman & Rivera, 2016).
This creates a unique type of dependency between firms where
collective action is taken to address systemic uncertainty. How a
group of firms and individuals possessing common interests arising
from systemic uncertainty reacts is not self-evident. We useambar).
le firms becoming mutually
nmental conditions that can
l., Managing systemic uncert
s://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019Mancur Olson's treatise (Olson, 1965, 2009) to emphasise his point
relating to the logic of collective action:
It does not follow, because all of the individuals in a groupwould
gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act
to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-
interested. Olson (2009:2)
The absence of collective action signalled by Olson (2009) might
arise from individuals facing a multiplicity of interests, with some
conflicting and therefore lowering the likelihood of collaboration in
areas where alignment might otherwise have been possible (Finke,
Gilchrist, & Mouzas, 2016). Alternatively, firm-level actors might
struggle to perceive the longer-term financial benefits arising from
broader collaboration initiatives (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995).
Further, while the logical response should be for all firms towant to
resolve systemic uncertainty, how this might be accomplished is
less clear. For example, a dominant firm might pursue the task
alone (Ansell & Gash, 2008), join a select group of firms and pri-
vatise a solution (Gray&Wood,1991), or all firmsmay contribute to
the solutions equally or unequally (Huxham, 2003). Activities
might be operationally conducted at the firm-level (Miller &
O'Leary, 2007), or extra-organisational entities may facilitate
inter-firm endeavours (Dekker, 2016). History has shown thatainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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P.J. Thambar et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx2whole industries have faced the threat of systemic uncertainty,
owing to new technology and product obsolescence, and have
failed to engage in industry-level collaborative actions to tackle
these common challenges e instead relying on the individual
prowess of each firm separately2 (Easley, 2005; Sinha & Mandel,
2008). Therefore, we consider how inter-firm mechanisms might
enable the tackling of systemic uncertainty at the industry-level.
Organisational research has studied inter-firm relationships
examining how an individual firm manages uncertainty in its
operating environment through collaboration with other firms
(Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Looy, 2008; Gulati, Lavie, & Singh,
2009), where management controls have been designed and used
to coordinate activities across firms (Whitley, 1999). This research
largely focuses on dyadic (Dekker, 2016) or network relationships
(Håkansson& Lind, 2006), where one firm dominates and leads the
design and use of management controls in search of a control so-
lution. Few studies have examined how coordinated actions at the
industry inter-firm level impact the management of uncertainty
(Dekker, 2016).
One such example of an attempt to go beyond the traditional
dyadic or networked inter-firm relationship is the Intel study car-
ried out by Miller and O'Leary (2007, 2005a, 2005b). Miller and
O'Leary investigate a network relationship where Intel was the
single, dominant firm in the industry (having 70% share of the
microprocessor market) and collectively organised its efforts with
multiple partner firms. They managed uncertainty by “visualising
the future” through Moore's Law and the Technology Roadmap,
derived from accepted scientific principles. This enabled them to
develop objectives and plan collaborative action. Intel led multiple
firms to strategize and communicate their research and develop-
ment (R&D) activity at the inter-firm level; however, the R&D itself
was resourced and conducted individually at the firm-level for in-
dividual firm benefit. We advance Miller and O'Leary's research by
examining how multiple firms collaborate to manage systemic
uncertainty when there is no dominant firm directing the activity,
where there is an absence of central overriding principles as a
unifying mechanism, and where R&D occurs at the inter-firm (in-
dustry) level and not at the firm-level.
Miller, Kurunm€aki, and O'Leary (2008), building uponMiller and
O'Leary (2007, 2005a, 2005b), conceptualise the use of hybrid el-
ements (organisational forms and processes) to manage industry-
level uncertainty. Hybrids are a theoretical construct most gener-
ally described as novel arrangements (Miller et al., 2008) used to
tackle extra-organisational uncertainty facing multiple firms in
ways not limited to hierarchical or market-based information flows
(Hopwood,1996; Kurunm€aki&Miller, 2011;Williamson,1979). The
hybrid construct naturally aligns to inter-organisational contexts
(Miller et al., 2008), and manifests as organisational forms, pro-
cesses, practices or expertise (Kurunm€aki & Miller, 2006). Hybrid
organisational forms have become common in many different in-
dustry settings and display characteristics that include public/pri-
vate ownership arrangements, sharing of strategic and operational
risks, and co-funding arrangements (Ciesielska, 2010; Thomasson,
2009).
Within management accounting research, the focus of hybrid
studies has been in the context of private inter-firm collaborations
(Miller et al., 2008), or regulatory inter-firm collaborations2 Consider the music industry's response to piracy, which was a systemic un-
certainty that affected all firms in the industry. Multi-firm collaboration to develop
solutions to the strategic challenges was not observed. Instead, the search for so-
lutions was driven by one or two firms, with differing levels of investment by in-
dustry participants, despite all firms being affected adversely by piracy activity
(Easley, 2005; Marshall, 2004; Sinha & Mandel, 2008; Van Wijk, 2002).
Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019(Kurunm€aki &Miller, 2011). Studies focusing on both, however, are
less forthcoming in accounting literature. Further, Miller et al.
(2008) did not empirically expand on hybrid control processes, or
examine and explain how different hybrid elements might inter-
relate in the management of systemic uncertainty.
Miller et al. (2008) also refer to boundary spanning activities
while discussing hybrids (Kurunm€aki, 2004). They argue that hy-
brids can arise due to the actions of key individuals at the firm-level
who take on inter-firm level responsibilities to bring about positive
inter-firm level outcomes (Marchington, Grimshaw, Rubery &
Willmott, 2005). Such individuals are termed boundary spanners
(Dekker, 2016) and are key to facilitating inter-firm collaboration.
They face the unenviable task of managing the tensions between
their inter-firm responsibilities and their own firm-level manage-
rial commitments (Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 2002). Few studies have
clarified how boundary spanners manage this tension in the
context of hybrids. Moreover, we contend that the working of inter-
firmmechanisms such as hybrids are plausibly linked to the actions
of boundary spanners (individuals transcending firm-level and
inter-firm level work). However, the literature has had very little to
say on this linkage between boundary spanners and hybrids.
We apply a resource dependence theory lens to mobilise ex-
planations for how inter-firm collaborative activity occurs (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory argues that an or-
ganisation's survival hinges on its ability to obtain critical resources
necessary for its survival. To this extent, organisational action is
predicated on a response to an external threat (Finkelstein, 1997),
with organisations seeking to absorb constraints using multiple
strategies (Gargiulo,1993).We investigate how inter-organisational
hybrids are implicated in the management of systemic uncertainty
by mobilising a novel and less studied resource dependence ty-
pology (low power imbalance, high mutual dependence; Casciaro
& Piskorski, 2005) to explain the effects of systemic uncertainty
on boundary spanner behaviour at the industry inter-firm level.
This relates to the way in which different hybrids are inter-linked
and mobilised within this resource dependent setting, which re-
quires the introduction of broader conceptualisations of hybrid
characteristics to those currently discussed in accounting studies
(beyond novelty and inter-firm).
Our field study is in the Australian cotton industry. This industry
faces systemic uncertainty3 arising from the impact of cotton pests
on cotton plants. We observed how key cotton growers, agribusi-
ness consultants, cotton administrators and agricultural scientists
acted as boundary spanners (Dekker, 2016), working beyond their
firm-level tasks to tackle this threat e securing funding initially
from cotton growers and then government to develop industry
firms that reflect the attributes of hybrid organisational forms
(Miller et al., 2008).
In our case setting, boundary spanners and industry firms
(hybrid forms) enabled the design and use of three novel inter-firm
hybrid control processes (environmental audits, R&D Facilitation
Systems, and Best Management Practices; BMP), operating at the
industry-level and firm-level. These hybrid control processes were
novel (Miller et al., 2008), existed at the inter-firm level, involved
public/private funding partnerships (Thomasson, 2009), and pro-
vided open source information for use by all cotton firms (Ciesielska,
2010).3 In our setting, multiple firms commonly faced multifaceted systemic uncer-
tainty arising from cotton pests which threaten to severely curtail the viability of
the cotton growing industry in Australia. We studied how cotton growers, and a
range of other related public and private stakeholders, addressed this critical
challenge facing the industry over an extended period of time. We collected data
covering a period of 52 years, drawing on data from 54 interviews, over 300
archival documents and extensive observations.
ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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counting literature. First, the workings of hybrids within a novel
resource dependence combination (high mutual dependence, low
power imbalance) is theoretically explained using a broader range
of attributes characterising hybrids than explored in extant ac-
counting research (Miller et al., 2008). The stream of studies initi-
ated by Miller, O'Leary and Kurunm€aki identify hybrids as being
impure combinations of usually disparate elements, which are
expressed as novel arrangements that span the inter-firm divide
(Miller et al., 2008). We add to these critical characteristics by also
identifying the potential public/private nature of inter-firm ar-
rangements (Thomasson, 2009) and the open source dissemination
(Ciesielska, 2010) of industry-level solutions as characteristics of
hybrids that are critical in explaining how our hybrid organisational
forms (i.e., industry firms) and hybrid control processes evolved to
work more effectively in our setting. The inability of individual
firms to tackle the problem led to mutual dependence and low
power imbalance in the industry. When coupled with the growing
importance of cotton production in the economy, this led to
increased government involvement in the resourcing of industry
activities over time (public/private) e initially with financial re-
sources and then broadening to a wider range of resources. This
was instrumental to the development of an industry-wide solution
to pest management. Further, the open dissemination of this so-
lution (open source) to all firms and broader society, irrespective of
differences in firm-level contributions to R&D, allowed for the so-
lution to be more comprehensively implemented for the greater
good of the cotton industry.
Our second contribution is explaining how, within this less
studied high mutual dependence/low power imbalance resource
dependence context (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), boundary span-
ners were able to operate with less tension than would ordinarily
be observed between boundary spanners at the firm-level and
industry-level (Anderson & Dekker, 2014; Coletti, Sedatole, &
Towry, 2005; Dekker, 2016). This low tension is less apparent in
extant boundary spanner research and is critical to explaining how
key cotton producers and scientists acted at the inter-firm level to
tackle uncertainty. In doing so, we add to the accounting literature
(Anderson & Dekker, 2014, 2005; Coletti et al., 2005; Dekker,
Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013) by addressing the calls by Dekker
(2016) for a broader understanding of boundary spanners and
how they facilitate inter-firm management controls beyond the
firm-level.
As an aside, the low power imbalance resource dependence
attribute aligns strongly to the notion of parity-based relationships.
Our findings broadly respond to Caglio and Ditillo’s (2008) calls for
accounting research to explain how controls manifest in a parity-
based, voluntary inter-firm relationship where no single partici-
pant dominates the inter-firm relationship. Our novel resource
dependence theory combination (high mutual dependence, low
power imbalance) therefore aligns strongly with the notion of
parity in inter-firm relations. Furthermore, this less studied
resource dependence combination (high mutual dependence, low
power imbalance) is increasingly prevalent in societies globally,
owing to the presence of industry-level systemic uncertainties as
outlined earlier (Tashman & Rivera, 2016). Our research explains
how collective strategies used to manage these challenges can be
implemented.
We next develop our theoretical framework based on the liter-
ature. Following this, we present our research method, discuss our
case findings, and conclude with an acknowledgement of the
study's limitations and suggestions for future research.Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.20192. Literature review and theoretical framework
We develop our theoretical framework by first examining cur-
rent literature on inter-firm management controls. Much of this
research focuses on dyadic relationships and management controls
designed and used by a focal firm to control the inter-firm rela-
tionship with another firm (Dekker, 2016). We then build an
argument for how industry-level management controls are
required, using resource dependence theory to develop an under-
standing of the challenges posed by systemic uncertainty and the
need for multiple firms to carry out coordinated activities. Finally,
we expand upon and theorise hybrid forms and hybrid control
processes, and explain how key firm-level actors (boundary span-
ners) enable multi-firm coordination to manage systemic
uncertainty.
2.1. Management control of inter-firm relationships
Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) broadly define management
control systems (MCS) as tools that help an organisation achieve its
strategic objectives. This definition encompasses the behavioural
(Chenhall, 2003; Sunder & Cyert, 1997) and more technical aspects
of control systems (Langfield-Smith, 1997, 2007; Merchant & Van
der Stede, 2012) currently put forward in the management ac-
counting literature. Building on these studies we define controls as
processes contributing to the attainment of organisational objec-
tives (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012) by directly or indirectly
shaping the behaviours of related individuals in organisations
(Chenhall, 2003).
Inter-firm relationships (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002) have
provided accounting researchers with an interesting context to
examine the role of management controls (Anderson & Dekker,
2014; Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Chen, Park, & Newburry, 2009;
Dekker, 2016). These relationships take many forms but the most
common type is the dyadic relationship between a buyer and seller
of products and services, or a firm and its outsourced supply
partner (Faems et al., 2008; Gulati et al., 2009; Kumar& Seth,1998).
Inter-firm relationships provide each firm with the ability to share
and access resources and competencies beyond their individual
firm boundaries and consequently manage uncertainty (Ireland
et al., 2002). However, these relationships also open up the firm
to the possibility of opportunistic behaviour from partners who
might not fully share resources and capabilities to achieve mutual
gains and who may have misaligned objectives which lead to
alternate actions (Anderson & Dekker, 2014). Consequently, man-
agement controls are required to align behaviour and achieve a
collaborative and coordinated focus to meet the common objec-
tives of the inter-firm relationship (Dekker, 2016).
Inter-firm management control research can be grouped into
two categories (Anderson & Dekker, 2014). First, a growing stream
of research has examined ex-ante management controls designed
and established by a firm at the outset of the relationship
(Anderson & Dekker, 2014; Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Faems et al.,
2008; Ireland et al., 2002). Ex-ante management controls have
been focused largely on contractual arrangements and partner se-
lection processes (Anderson, Christ, Dekker, & Sedatole, 2015). The
contractual arrangements put in place in an inter-firm relationship
are classified as ‘incomplete contracting’ due to the information
asymmetry that exists between the firms; the focus of management
control research therefore has been on how these contracts can be
made more complete to effect good control (Anderson & Dekker,
2014; Dekker, 2003, 2008).
A number of studies have examined the role of contracts and
partner selection processes as ex-ante management controls (e.g.,
Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Anderson et al., 2015; Dekker, 2008;ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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Krishnan, Miller, & Sedatole, 2011). Studies examining contracts
have focused on examining specific clauses (Anderson & Dekker,
2005), exit arrangements (Anderson et al., 2015), level of detail
(Krishnan et al., 2011), complexity (Ding et al., 2013), and the nature
and type of contracts used (Dekker, 2008). Studies that have
focused on partner selection processes have examined selection
criteria used (Anderson et al., 2015), organisational activities
employed in the selection process (Dekker et al., 2013), and prior
experience and information on partners (Dekker, 2008; Dekker &
Van den Abbeele, 2010; Ding et al., 2013). These studies provide
an understanding that firms use contracts and partner selection
processes as interrelated management controls with more detailed
and tight contracts when entering into a relationship with a new
partner, when operating in a highly uncertain environment, or
when the transaction characteristics cannot be clearly defined and
agreed upfront. When contracting with known partners from prior
relationships, contracts can be more flexible and collaborative as
the level of information and trust in the partner is higher. This
understanding reduces the need for complex and detailed
contractual conditions and terms (Gulati et al., 2009). The extent to
which such controls enable voluntary participation from a range of
firms beyond a dyad remains unexplored.4
A second and more limited stream of inter-firm management
control research has focused on other forms of control choices
made by managers (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). Cooper and Slagmulder
(2004) examine how cost information was shared and used by
partners to control transactions and behaviours in a dyadic inter-
firm relationship in the manufacturing sector in Japan. This cost
information helped to reduce information asymmetry in this rela-
tionship by enabling the focal firm to guide the product develop-
ment activities of the supply firm and reduce costs while
developing improved cooperation and coordination of these
product development activities. Similarly, Dekker (2003) shows
how an activity based costing model and cost information were
useful in helping to coordinate activities in a buyer-seller rela-
tionship; this enabled all parties to have a similar understanding of
product costs and expectations for how these costs were to be
managed to create value for all partners. Conducting coordinated
inter-firm research at the firm-level has merit, but also requires
flexibility to cater to individual firm-level management re-
quirements. Wouters and Sandholzer (2018) observe how an inter-
firm management accounting application of standards (cost of
ownership) was used to communicate firm-level costs to other
firms in the partnership, but in a way that allowed for firm specific
adaptability. Firm-level choices regarding the aspects of the stan-
dard applied, and cost of ownership calculations, might be con-
ducted in different ways to facilitate the internal versus external
information needs of partners. However, when research is con-
ducted at the inter-firm level, our understanding of how control
processes might manifest is less clear (Dekker, 2016).
Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) examine a technology
outsourcing related inter-firm relationship and find that outcome
and social controls were useful in controlling the relationship by4 Trust based controls have also been considered an important feature of inter-
firm management controls (Dekker, 2008; Faems et al., 2008; Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). As a form of social control, trust develops through
prior experience and information about the partner (Dekker & Van den Abbeele,
2010). Trust also develops through inter-firm management controls (Vosselman &
van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Trust is seen to influence and shape other man-
agement controls (e.g., partner selection processes) and appears to be capable of
operating interrelatedly with contracts and partner selection and other forms of
control (Anderson et al., 2014; Dekker et al., 2013; Dekker, 2008; Ding et al., 2013,
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). These controls are not the focus of this study.
Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
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et al. (2015) study the relevance of intra-firm management control
frameworks for inter-firm management control. Their study
focused on three commonly used frameworks provided by Simons
(1995), Merchant and Van der Stede (2012), and Jensen and
Meckling (1992). Anderson et al. (2015) found that the Simons
(1995) and Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) frameworks were
useful to enable coordination of activities in value creation firms;
while the Jensen and Meckling (1992) control framework, with its
focus on economic performance, was useful in firms with a focus on
transaction efficiency and cost minimisation.
Much of the above research examines inter-firm relationships
between two (dyadic) firms, usually a buyer-seller relationship and
more importantly, from the perspective of the initiating (focal) firm
(Anderson & Dekker, 2014; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2016).
The management controls developed and used in these inter-firm
relationships are also concentrated on the needs of the focal firm
(Miller& O'Leary, 2005a). There has been less interest in examining
management controls from the perspective of the “other” partner
in the dyadic relationship. Further still, the inter-firm management
control research literature pays limited attention to multiple-firm
relationships such as network relationships (Håkansson & Lind,
2006) and parity-based multi-firm relationships (Caglio & Ditillo,
2008).
Network relationships are partnerships where one firm takes on
the focal firm role (Håkansson & Lind, 2006; Miller & O'Leary,
2005a, 2005b). Other firms in the network relate to this focal
firm and are directed and guided by the focal firm. The character-
istics of this form of inter-firm relationships have many similarities
to a dyadic relationship (e.g., focal firm focus) andmay be a factor in
the few studies examining these forms of relationships (Dekker,
2016; Håkansson & Lind, 2006). Miller and O'Leary (2005a) pro-
vide one useful study that has examined a network form of rela-
tionship with Intel as the focal firm. In this study, the authors
showed how technology roadmaps were designed as an inter-firm
management control to coordinate activities related to the devel-
opment of chip technology between Intel and a network of sup-
pliers, customers and other stakeholders within the technology
sector.
Parity-based multi-firm relationships are rarely studied in the
inter-firm management control literature (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008).
Such relationships are between multiple firms who operate largely
as equals with no single firm dominating the relationship. As a
consequence of focusing on the focal firm in dyadic relationships,
inter-firm management control research has focused less on how
firms manage the behaviour of managers and employees assigned
to boundary spanning roles in the inter-firm relationship (Dekker,
2016; Taylor, 2005). Boundary spanners drive the focal firm's in-
terest in the inter-firm relationship but are also required to
consider the needs and objectives of the other partner in the
relationship. This becomes more acute when the relationship in-
volves multiple firms, and where no single firm is dominant and
able to drive its own interests. While tackling a broader problem,
such as systemic uncertainty, may incentivise collaboration among
boundary spanners, such a parity-based relationship lacking a
dominant entity may cause boundary spanners to experience more
conflict as they have greater scope to seek more influence at the
inter-firm level to further their own firm interests. How manage-
ment controls are designed and used in this parity-based rela-
tionship to influence behaviour of firms and key actors within these
firms remains an open question e this has not received much
consideration in the inter-firm control literature (Dekker, 2016).
This issue would seem to be even more salient if uncertainty is
systemic across multiple firms in a given setting.ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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Increasingly, firms face industry-wide issues related to sus-
tainability, availability of resources, external threats (including
pollution and biological pests) and other factors which pose sys-
temic uncertainty affecting all firms within the industry in similar
ways (Bebbington & Thomson, 2013). These systemic uncertainties
create mutual dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) between firms, seemingly incentivising collabora-
tion to share resources and coordinate actions (Chesbrough &
Appleyard, 2007).
Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that a firm can
access the resources required to manage external uncertainties
from other firms, and eliminate or reduce constraints resulting
from these uncertainties (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman,
Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These
constraint absorption mechanisms can take the form of mergers
and acquisitions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), joint ventures,
interlocking board directorships (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), and
other forms of inter-firm relationships (Hillman et al., 2009). A
fundamental assumption in RDT is that a focal firm can absorb and
manage constraints imposed by external uncertainties by accessing
resources from other firms (Davis& Cobb, 2010). RDT, in its original
form, offered limited guidance for managing mutual dependencies
between multiple firms emerging from systemic uncertainty
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) extend RDT by separating
resource dependency into two elements: power imbalance and
mutual dependence. Power imbalance is created between two or
more firms where control over resources is held by one firm (Boyd,
1990). However, the use of common suppliers, access to key
personnel, technologies and other related business factors can also
make firms mutually dependent (Tolbert, 1985). Systemic uncer-
tainty across multiple firms further creates mutual dependencies
(Hart, 1995). The extension of RDT by Casciaro and Piskorski (2005)
provides a basis to understand how firms, faced with systemic
uncertainty, become mutually dependent. However, Casciaro and
Piskorski (2005) do not articulate how control mechanisms might
be used to manage such mutual dependency in the absence of
power imbalance, nor do they offer an empirical explication of how
controls beyond the firm-level might contribute to the same. We
position hybrids (Miller et al., 2008) as enablers of industry-level
efforts aimed at managing systemic uncertainty.
2.3. The role of hybrids
Hybrids are “new phenomena produced out of two or more
elements normally found separately” or not ordinarily thought of as
being connected (Miller et al., 2008, p. 943). In the transaction cost
economics literature (Williamson, 2002, 1991, 1979), studies
initially identified hybrid organisational forms as an alternative to
markets and hierarchies for organising transactions in efficient and
effective ways. Hybrid forms were seen to enable firms to coordi-
nate activities to manage uncertainty and risk. Early research
focused on the importance of collaborative organisational forms
(Eccles, 1981), emphasising the structural aspects of hybridity. The
coming together of multiple firms to create new organisational
forms through mergers and acquisitions, public-private partner-
ships (Brandsen, Karre, & Helderman, 2009; Thomasson, 2009),
strategic alliances (Millar, 2012), joint ventures (Palmer, 1990), or
novel contracts binding suppliers (Piore & Sabel, 1984) all reveal
traits related to hybrids (Borys & Jemison, 1989).
Hybrids bring together ideas from two or more separate spaces
and combine them to generate new learnings and approaches
(Adler, 2001; Miller et al., 2008). Though hybrids were traditionallyPlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019defined as organisational forms (Williamson, 1991), Miller et al.
(2008:943) extend the construct by arguing that “… hybrids …
can take the form of organisational arrangements … they can also
take the form of hybrid control processes, practices or expertise”.
They further argue that “… the world is populated by hybrids or
intermediaries that constantly mix up and link up apparently
disparate and heterogeneous things … actors, entities, objects,
practices, processes and bodies of expertise can all be regarded as
hybrids” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 944). We apply this broader defi-
nition of hybrids introduced into the management accounting
literature and focus on hybrid organisational forms and hybrid
control processes, explaining the individual hybrid definitions un-
derpinning each of these elements.5
2.4. Hybrid organisational forms
Hybrid organisation forms are organisation types that do not
follow the constructs associated with traditional organisations, but
instead combine elements that are unexpected. A hybrid form, for
example, can be an organisation that is neither solely privately or
publicly owned, but an entity incorporating elements of a public-
private partnership (often observed in large public infrastructure
projects; Mitronen & M€oller, 2003; Thomasson, 2009). Alterna-
tively, an organisation might be hybrid owing to its open source
origins, leaving the rights to its output in the hands of the broader
public (Ciesielska, 2010). This non-traditional sharing of arguably
private intellectual property rights defines the hybridity of the
organisational form from a stakeholder benefit point of view,
extending the rights to organisational assets beyond shareholder/
managerial control. Hybrid organisations can also manifest as
extra-organisational third sector entities such as associations and
co-operatives (Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014; Valentinov, 2004)
that reflect the interests of firms, regulators, suppliers and broader
society under the umbrella of an industry-level endeavour.
Miller and O'Leary (2007), for example, highlight the role of
SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Industry Association) as key to
allowing firm-level participants to interact and discuss their
learnings regarding semiconductor technologies collaboratively.
However, the actual conduct of R&D and innovation at the
industry-level (as opposed to the dissemination of firm-level R&D
information as observed in Miller & O'Leary, 2007) remains less
studied in inter-firm research. Menard (2004) alludes to the
absence of these alternate hybrid organisational forms and laments
the lack of further study of these same organisations. We address
this concern in our study, but importantly also identify the possi-
bility that collaborations might not form, notwithstanding the
imperative to do so. For example, the music industry tackled the
strategic threat of piracy in a manner that involved R&D activities
within the individual firm (VanWijk, 2002). Instead, their industry-
level collaborations were loose and largely limited to the legal
aspect of policing and remedying piracy behaviour as a deterrent
(Marshall, 2004).
2.5. Hybrid control processes
Hybrid control processes refer to processes that transcend
organisational boundaries by facilitating lateral inter-
organisational information flows including, but not limited to,
budgeting, planning and performance evaluation relatedainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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organisational forms may not all possess hybrid properties them-
selves. Therefore, hybrid control processes must exhibit the quali-
ties of a hybrid element in their day to day operationalisation. For
example, these control processes might be an activity involving
informational flows beyond the boundaries of any one organisation
(Kurunm€aki & Miller, 2011), or it might be a control process that
specifically effects the open source dissemination of an output.
The extant literature generally assumes hybrid control processes
will form from the deliberate actions of firms (Miller et al., 2008).
However, we have little understanding of how hybrid control
processes might manifest from hybrid organisational forms
(Doherty et al., 2014), or are mobilised by boundary spanner
behaviour. For example, hybrid control processes might express as
processes that combine multifaceted elements to facilitate their
execution (Kitchener, 2000), involving both public and private
stakeholders (Mitronen & M€oller, 2003). Alternatively, they might
be the mechanism through which organisations publicly dissemi-
nate private innovations for a greater purpose (Doherty et al., 2014).
Finally, control processes may be hybrid in nature owing to how
they are enacted across organisations (Miller et al., 2008), or at
different organisational levels (industry-level to firm-level), for
purposes of achieving their control objective.
2.6. Boundary spanners
The concept of boundary spanners originates from studies that
examine the coordination of interdependent work efforts between
individuals at the intra-firm level (Marrone, 2010). Boundary
spanning has been described and examined at the individual and
team level with a focus on intra-firm and inter-firm coordination
(Richter, West, Van Dick, & Dawson, 2006). Boundary spanners are
identified as defining and managing activities that span the
boundary between firms (Ancona, 1990). A large focus of the
boundary spanner literature is on team-based boundary spanning
(Druskat & Wheeler, 2003).
Research into boundary spanner activity at the individual level
shows that attitudinal and behavioural moderators play a key role
in the success of boundary spanning individuals (Richter et al.,
2006). These include the extent the individual is identified with
the organisation and the degree of contact between the individual
and the inter-group members. Higher levels of identification and
contact are found to lead to more effective boundary spanning. At
a team level, boundary spanning contributes to improved
problem-solving capabilities, increased effectiveness in uncertain
settings, the ability to execute complex tasks, and increased
alignment with firm strategy (Denison, Hart, & Kahn, 1996).
Boundary spanning activities allow for disconnected actors to
communicate, enabling information transfer, knowledge creation
and innovation (Argote, McEvily,& Reagans, 2003; Marrone, 2010;
Richter et al., 2006).
In an inter-firm relationship where firms remain focused on
their individual strategic objectives, boundary spanners can
become conflicted as they are subject to their own firm's strategic
objectives but are also influenced by the strategic objectives of the
inter-firm relationship and interactions with their counterparts in
the other firms (Dekker, 2016). Boundary spanners might become
disillusioned, insecure and/or face sanctions if they push the in-
terests of the inter-firm relationship above their own firm's in-
terests. However, according to Richter et al. (2006), an over-riding
loyalty to the home firm will drive boundary spanners to exert
influence within the inter-firm relationship, aiming to create a
context which is similar to their home firm. This suggests there is a
tension in the literature on the role of boundary spanners in an
inter-firm relationship which has not been fully investigated andPlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019understood (Dekker, 2016). Boundary spanners can play a key
unifying and engagement role in parity-based relationships, coor-
dinating actions to manage systemic uncertainty, yet any role
conflicts and tensions may adversely impact this important
function.
2.7. Focus of the study
In summary, we have a developing understanding of the role of
management controls in dyadic inter-firm relationships but less
understanding of how management controls are used in parity-
based multi-firm relationships at an industry-level where there is
no single dominant firm. Furthermore, our understanding of how
systemic uncertainty is managed by multiple firms in this type of
parity-based relationship is limited. We argue that the absence of
capability by individual firms to address industry-level systemic
uncertainty creates an incentive for greater collaboration and co-
ordination; however, a key question is not only whether firms need
to collaborate but how they collaborate and coordinate their ac-
tivities to drive a collective response.
Miller et al. (2008) provide a broader conceptualisation of hy-
brids as the basis for managing systemic uncertainties beyond the
firm-level in a range of inter-firm relationships, including parity-
based multi-firm relationships. However, they do not expand or
clarify how these broader hybrid elements might interrelate, nor
how collective action may be tackled by the interaction between
different types of hybrids. We identify a unique resource depen-
dence combination and study how boundary spanner activities
drive the workings of hybrid organisational forms and hybrid
control processes, to tackle systemic uncertainty at an inter-
organisational level.
3. Research method
The analysis in this paper is based on a field study carried out in
the Australian cotton industry. Australian cotton is an AUD 2 billion
industry6 with Australia being the third largest exporter of cotton in
the world. Australian cotton is in high demand due to its high
quality and reliable supply, with bales priced between AUD
300e600. In 2015, the Australian cotton industry produced 2.2
million bales of cotton from 196,898 ha of land. Cotton is Australia's
sixth largest agricultural export, representing around 5% of total
agricultural export revenues. The Australian cotton industry is
located in the states of New SouthWales (NSW) and Queensland. In
NSW, cotton is grown in the Gwydir, Namoi and Macquarie valleys,
along the Barwon and Darling Rivers in the west, and the Lachlan
and Murrumbidgee Rivers in the south. The regional centre for
cotton is the town of Narrabri. In Queensland (Qld), cotton is grown
in the Darling Downs, St. George, Dirranbandi and Macintyre val-
leys (South Qld), and in the region near the towns of Emerald,
Theodore and Biloela (Central Qld). The modern cotton industry
started in the early 1960s, when American migrant cotton growers
joined Australian farmers to grow irrigated cotton in the Narrabri
area. There are now more than 1200 cotton farms almost evenly
split between NSW and Qld.
Field study research enables the researcher to study phenomena
in their natural setting and to make sense of his or her observations
by moving between data and theory (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006;
Jorgensen & Messner, 2010; Yin, 2003). As part of a research team,
two of the authors spent considerable periods of time in the field,
observing the activities of the participants in the cotton setting,
asking questions and interacting with participants at key eventsainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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study formed part of an industry funded project, we are satisfied
that we were provided with good access to participants and data in
order to form our findings.
The fieldwork was carried out over a period of 24 months, from
January 2012 to December 2013.7 During this period, the research
team carried out five field trips to the main cotton growing regions
in NSW and Queensland to collect data. Two of the authors formed
part of the research team on these trips. On each trip, the re-
searchers spent between 2 and 5 days collecting data. Semi-
structured interviews provided the primary source of data for the
study: 54 interviews were carried out with 48 participants, with
interviews averaging around 70min (Appendix 1). The interviews
were conducted with a range of industry participants including
cotton growers and cotton researchers, managers from industry
firms, and cotton agribusiness consultants. The interviews were
recorded and transcribed.
Archival documents (Appendix 2) provided extensive data on
the cotton industry, its hybrids and industry-level management
controls. These documents related to the four industry firms and
included their annual reports, strategic plans, minutes of board and
other committee meetings, industry reports commissioned by the
industry firms, books written on the development of the industry,
papers and proceedings of the Australian cotton conference, web-
sites, and other social media data. The lead author reviewed and
drafted notes on these archival documents to gather data subse-
quently used in the study.
Formal observational data (Appendix 3) was collected by the lead
author as part of the research team attending committee meetings
arranged by the industry firms and was supplemented by informal
observations during discussions at lunch and coffee breaks. Two of
the authors, as part of the research team, also attended conferences
and workshops arranged by the industry firms to observe in-
teractions between participants. The bi-annual cotton conference
provided an important opportunity to observe the interactions be-
tween cotton growers and cotton researchers, particularly at
breakout workshop sessions where researchers presented their
project findings and received feedback from growers.
The approach to data analysis was based on primary pattern
matching supplemented by explanation building (Patton, 2002)
related to important theoretical concepts: systemic uncertainties,
hybrid expertise, organisational forms, and industry-level control
processes (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Yin, 2003). Empirical data was
used to assess, refine and develop the theoretical framework taken
to the field and to build an understanding of different hybrid ele-
ments. Data was coded using NVivo software (version 10) and fol-
lowed a manifest coding approach where the visible content in the
text is coded (Neuman, 2000). Data coding was carried out by the
lead author and was reviewed by another author. The analysed data
was written up as “thick narratives” (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003) to
develop an empirically based theoretical understanding of systemic
uncertainties and the different hybrid elements.
4. Case findings and analysis
Owing to the broad range of themes covered in our findings, we
intersperse our findings with occasional analyses of their meaning
in relation to our broader theoretical arguments. These relate to
hybrids and boundary spanners brought about by resource
dependence. We then supplement these points of analyses with a
discussion of their theoretical importance in our discussion section.
A summary of our explanations concerning the three hybrid7 The data for this study were collected as part of a five-year industry study.
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We also include a timeline of key events discussed in this section
as Table 2.
4.1. Systemic uncertainty leading to resource dependence: the
challenge from cotton pests
A systemic uncertainty is an externality that indiscriminately
impacts all firms in an industry (Tashman& Rivera, 2016). By virtue
of its ubiquitous impact on all players, the uncertainty is of such a
magnitude that it poses multifaceted and interdisciplinary chal-
lenges to those affected. Resolving it therefore requires effort from
those with the capacity to capture the different facets of the un-
certainty e thematically and structurally.
Thematically, the cotton pest Helicoverpa armigera (cotton
bollworm) created systemic uncertainty from different perspec-
tives for cotton growers in the Australian cotton industry. Cotton
pests are indifferent to farm boundaries and this necessitated cot-
ton growers to carry out similar and coordinated operational ac-
tivities to combat this pest. A key activity to minimise the adverse
effects of the cotton pest was the use of pesticides (e.g., Endo-
sulfan). Pesticides reduce damage caused by the cotton pest and
thereby minimise yield reduction. However, over time the cotton
pest began to develop biological resistance8 to Endosulfan and
yields began to decline (McHugh, 1996).
Biological resistance to pesticides poses a scientific, agricultural
and economic challenge. Scientifically, the research required to
understand the base elements upon which pesticides might effec-
tively eradicate pests is significantly difficult. Pesticides need to be
developed in a manner that minimises the occurrence and
magnitude of adverse second and third order effects on the broader
agricultural industry, such as on livestock, waterways and people.
Such research serves to manage these trade-offs while also being
cost effective.
The presence of cotton pests created systemic uncertainty as
individual firms lacked the capabilities and resources to manage
this challenge individually. This created resource dependence be-
tween firms due to mutual dependence, and therefore reduced any
power imbalance that might otherwise exist (Casciaro & Piskorski,
2005). Firms therefore had some incentive to engage with each
other in a parity-based multi-firm relationship (Caglio & Ditillo,
2008) as all were equally concerned with finding a solution. Still,
systems to incentivise participation and involvement in these
different areas required leadership from key individuals, especially
at the early stages of the industry.
Systemic uncertainty made cotton growing firms interdepen-
dent. In the early periods of the cotton industry (1960's & 1970's),
each cotton firm attempted to coordinate its operational activities
to combat the cotton pest with other cotton growing firms; how-
ever, this coordination was often limited and consequently unsuc-
cessful (e.g., aerial spraying of pesticides was done independently
by firms and created challenges for the industry through contam-
ination of waterways). Cotton growing firms in Australia therefore
became mutually dependent (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Coordi-
nation mechanisms were needed at the industry-level to enable
cotton growing firms to strategically manage cotton pests, to
develop improved pest management techniques, and to executeand biochemistry of resistance, little progress has been achieved in formulating
practical countermeasures against the inexorable march of resistance’ (Prof Taylor,
CE, 1985, Address to the Linnean Society of London, as reported in Forrester, 1993).
ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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Table 1
Boundary spanners, hybrid organisational forms and hybrid industry-level management controls.





Boundary spanners e founders simultaneously owned farms
and allotted significant personal time/resources to the
advancement of the Australian cotton industry
Enablers of other hybrids and
industry-level management controls
 Lobbying government and regulatory
agencies for funding and support
 Enrolling other cotton growers and
researchers as boundary spanners
 Taking on leadership roles within the
industry firms and committees
 Making strategic appointments to key
roles on industry committees
 Encouraging co-location of growers, re-
searchers and industry policy specialists
Hybrid organisational forms e industry bodies
Cotton Australia (CA) Industry-level association e membership (ownership) by
cotton growers
Advocacy, policy and strategy
development for cotton growers
Public-private organising mechanism
Industry firms
 Cooperative structure, grower members
drive firm's agenda
 Work with government to design






Industry-level association e membership (ownership) by
cotton growers
Flexible organisational arrangement
tasked with developing an agenda for
industry-level R&D
Executive committee with diverse
skills
Public-private funding mechanism
 Cooperative structure, growers part of
executive committee driving research
agenda
 Active involvement by a wide range of
stakeholders, including researchers and
consultants, in decision making
 Private cotton grower levy contribution






Industry-level government owned corporation for R&D
funding
Bring cotton growers, researchers and
consultants together, to conduct
projects endorsed by ACGRA
Public-private project approval and
funding process
 Program management of research
projects with government and private
industry endorsement
 Funding of approved projects using




Industry-level government owned research partner firm Building research capacity for running
projects funded by CRDC
Public-private research connector and
capability building hub
Convene 11 core and 36 affiliate research
partners to conduct research funded by
CRDC and approved by ACGRA
Hybrid control processes
Environmental Audit Industry-level control process
Assessing the operational performance of farms in relation to
pesticides and preventive activities
Multifaceted coordination of different
skillsets to appraise performance
Conducted with private and public
sector respondents
Novel, unexpected process
 Speaking to farmers, government
officials, scientific researchers, other
industry representative






Industry-level management control (knowledge
development)
Multifaceted coordination of different
skillsets to identify solution
Involved public and private parties
 Multiple R&D projects to develop new
information




Industry-level management control (knowledge application) Multifaceted coordination of solution
transfer from industry-level to firm-
level
Open dissemination of privately
developed knowledge
 Optimal processes developed out of R&D
disseminated to cotton growers for
implementation
 BMP guidelines openly disseminated in a
non-proprietary manner
Table 2
Timeline to support case findings and analysis.
Time period Key events
1960s to mid-
2000s
Transformation of the modern cotton industry to combat the systemic uncertainty posed by cotton pests.
1960s Arrival of the three pioneer boundary spanners (Derera, Kahl and Hadley) into the cotton industry. Progressively other boundary spanners were added
to the group of boundary spanners.
1972 to date Establishment and ongoing operations of Cotton Australia and ACGRA as industry firms focused respectively on strategy and advocacy, and research
direction and funding (respectively). ACGRA was absorbed into Cotton Australia in 2008.
1960e1990 Cotton Research Council was the key Australian Government funding agency for cotton research projects.
1990 to date Establishment and operation of CRDC as an Australian Government business entity with responsibility for government funding of cotton research
projects. Replaced Cotton Research Council.
1991 Design and implementation of the Environmental Audit to survey cotton growers and other relevant stakeholders to assess understanding of the impact
of cotton pests and current cotton growing activities, and to gather information on changes needed to manage the systemic uncertainty.
1993e2012 Establishment and operation of the Cotton CRC which provided research skills and capabilities through partners to the cotton industry.
1993e1998 Intensive use of R&D projects and programs to develop new information to design improved cotton growing activities.
1998 to date Design and implementation of BMP, incorporating information from R&D to improve cotton growing activities to manage systemic uncertainty.
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ties). This was needed to ensure the survival of the cotton industry.
To this end, the rise of individuals thinking beyond their own farms
and investments in broader uniform approaches to tackling such
problems at the industry-level were key to facilitating such
responses.
4.2. Boundary spanner inter-firm behaviours e lower levels of
tension
In our field setting, a new and evolving group of cotton growers
and researchers acted to develop the industry in the belief that
doing so would further the operations of their own firms and
research interests. We class them as boundary spanners consistent
with Dekker (2016). The boundary spanner, as an actor with
expertise, operates beyond firm boundaries while holding an initial
affiliation with a firm-level entity (Dekker, 2016). While it may be
reasonable to argue that it is impossible to study all the potential
boundary spanners who played a role in the development of the
cotton industry, the boundary spanners discussed below represent
an important and dominant set of individuals who exerted great
influence on the cotton industry. In doing so, we illustrate the
motivating factors underpinning their drive to contribute at the
industry-level, and the manner by which they exerted their efforts
to shape the industry response to the cotton pest challenge.
To this extent, three immigrant cotton researchers and farmers
are noteworthy (McHugh, 1996). Nick Derera was a Hungarian and
Soviet Union refugee, agricultural scientist and cotton grower who
carried out research into cotton growing in the Narrabri region,
discovering favourable growing conditions for large-scale cotton
farms. Though a scientist by trade, he foresaw tremendous com-
mercial opportunities inherent in the land and advocated for
farmers to consider the region for cotton growing.
Paul Kahl and Frank Hadley were two American cotton growers
struggling to grow cotton in Southern California. They saw the
potential to be foundational partners in a developing cotton in-
dustry in Australia, and sought out Derera to explore the oppor-
tunity further. Derera, simultaneously acting as a researcher and
industry advocate for the development of the cotton industry in
Narrabri, actively encouraged Kahl and Hadley to come and grow
cotton in Australia:
Cotton growing in Australia has a great future… I wish to assure
you that the climatic and environmental conditions desirable is
available in NSWand especially in the Naomi Valley……most of
the present farmers are not accustomed to intensive farming …
therefore this industry must depend on new young farmers or
on migrant farmers who have experience with any type of
intensive farming. (letter from Derera to Kahl and Hadley;
McHugh, 1996:6e7).
In 1961, Kahl and Hadley established a small cotton farm inWee
Waa, near Narrabri and began to grow natural cotton on 60 acres of
land. They were soon joined by other cotton growers, in particular
Australians Frank Boyle and Vic Melbourne, who also started small
cotton farms in adjoining areas around Narrabri. In 1962, these
growers had their first successful cotton harvest (McHugh, 1996)
but yields were hampered by pests. To commercialise and maxi-
mise their returns, these growers needed to improve cotton
growing activities and technologies to combat cotton pests
(McHugh, 1996), and also address other ancillary concerns such as
the development of infrastructure to support the industry.
These early participants fully appreciated the need for collabo-
ration and coordination across the cotton industry, between cotton
growing firms and other stakeholders such as cotton research firmsPlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019and cotton agribusiness consulting firms:
I think some of the early leaders in the industry basically
identified that the only way that they could make progress was
to work together. So, there was that collaborative aspect right
from the outset. (Cotton Agribusiness Consultant 2)
They understood the strategic importance of continually
developing new cotton cultivars or varieties that were more resis-
tant to cotton pests, requiring less use of harmful pesticides and less
water but able to provide higher yields. They also understood the
importance of new operational activities for growing cotton sus-
tainably, protecting the natural ecosystems around cotton plants:
My father was just absolutely committed to the value of
research and the importance of research. It could have been just
the fact that there was enough people around that saw that it
was important enough to invest voluntarily in to make the in-
dustry work. (Cotton Agribusiness Consultant 3)
The three foundational pioneers of the cotton industryeDerera,
Kahl and Hadleye exhibited related but different strategic business
and leadership skills and used their skills collectively to go beyond
the firm-level and play an industry leading role for cotton. They
adapted their skills, from personal and professional experience, as
individual managers, cotton growers and agricultural scientists. To
these skills, the boundary spanners added soft skills (e.g.,
communication skills, negotiation skills) to provide leadership to
the developing group of cotton growers and cotton researchers as
they collaborated to develop the cotton industry and face the
strategic challenge arising from cotton pests, a key source of sys-
temic uncertainty. These foundational boundary spanners were
joined by other actors in the industry who were prepared to
operate as boundary spanners themselves, exhibiting multifaceted
skills to develop coordinated actions to manage the systemic un-
certainty arising from the cotton pest:
In theolddays, the industrywasreallygovernedbyAuscott,Namoi
CottonandQueenslandCotton (large cottonfirms). So, theywould
have more representatives on all the industry bodies like Cotton
Australia, ACGRA [Australian Cotton Growers Research Associa-
tion]. To their credit, they also would support their staff. But they
wouldsendgrowers, nowpeople thataremembersof the co-op…
to their gins to representACGRA, to sit onACGRAanddiscuss these
things. (Cotton Agribusiness Consultant 3)
The role of the boundary spanner in our setting appeared to be
less contested and relatively free of conflict arising from their
industry-level and firm-level roles (Anderson & Dekker, 2014; Luo,
2005; Richter et al., 2006). Boundary spanners ordinarily grapple
for authority at the industry-level, seeking benefit for their own
firm over broader inter-firm industry-level interests (Dekker, 2016;
Richter et al., 2006). In our setting, boundary spanners seemed to
be operating in an environment with low conflict between their
firm-level and industry-level roles. As discussed by Casciaro and
Piskorski (2005), inter-firm relationships become more parity-
based relationships when all firms in the relationship face a com-
mon systemic uncertainty, reducing the power imbalance between
collaborating firms. Our evidence indicates that boundary spanners
need each other from two perspectives e to provide resources so
that the industry can tackle the problem, and ensure the partaking
of all boundary spanner firm-level entities in the solutions pre-
scribed by industry-level innovations.
Boundary spanners therefore enter their interactions withainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
.03.002
P.J. Thambar et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx10others at the industry-level with less tension between their indi-
vidual firm and broader industry-level roles. While prior boundary
spanner studies have long identified uncertainty and environ-
mental dynamism as adversely affecting the functioning of
boundary spanners (Aldrich & Herker, 1977), contributing specif-
ically to boundary spanner perceived stress and consequently
impacting outcomes (Stamper & Johlke, 2003), we found that sys-
temic uncertainty created a more enabling and supportive context
for boundary spanning, leading to lower levels of tension in their
roles as firm-level actors and inter-firm collaborators. Our findings
on the role of boundary spanners provides an alternative insight
into the role of boundary spanners; we next discuss the industry-
level control implications of this cooperative theme underlying
boundary spanner interactions.9 http://www.smh.com.au/comment/obituaries/paul-kahl-cofounder-of-
modern-australian-cotton-industry-20150220-13k5cb.html (accessed 24 March
2017).
10 ACGRA and Cotton Australia worked closely together in setting the strategic
direction for R&D across the industry. In 2008, ACGRA was absorbed into Cotton
Australia.4.3. Boundary spanner behaviours and hybrid organisational forms
In our field setting, in the absence of any dominant firm driving
the collaboration as observed in Miller and O'Leary (2007, 2005a,
2005b), alternate mechanisms were developed to provide a plat-
form to bring multiple firms together, to collaborate, develop co-
ordinated activities, and identify solutions that enabled the
management of systemic uncertainty to the industry. Boundary
spanners realised that industry bodies (hybrid organisational
forms) needed to be formed to provide a platform formultiple firms
to connect, collaborate and develop coordinated activities to
address the common challenges faced.
We consider these industry bodies as hybrid organisational
forms as they represent a mix of industry-level entities with an
ultimate profit driven motive at a firm-level, whose strategic di-
rection and funding decisions were shaped by private actors
comprising their foundational client base (cotton growers) as well
as cotton researchers and other actors (e.g., government) pursuing
the security of the cotton resource from a macroeconomic
perspective. This conjoint influence of the public and private sec-
tors is aligned to the stakeholder breadth element of hybrid orga-
nisations put forward in Thomasson (2009). Also, while there was a
level of government involvement, the ultimate intention of these
industry firms was to protect the cotton industry from systemic
uncertainty arising from the cotton pest, directly facilitating the
profit motive of private farmers (Valentinov, 2004).
The development of industry bodies, however, presented a
costly endeavour requiring significant resources. The boundary
spanners therefore initially established smaller, more narrowly
focused industry firms that were managed by private cotton
growers who strongly lobbied and advocated for strategic shifts in
relation to regulation and policy process in the Australian cotton
industry. We specifically identify four industry firms established
over a period of time: Cotton Australia (CA), the Australian Cotton
Growers Research Association (ACGRA), the Cotton Research
Development Corporation (CRDC), and the Cotton Cooperative
Research Centre (Cotton CRC). These industry firms were developed
by key boundary spanners (e.g., Kahl, Hadley, etc.) who saw the
need for a structured response to tackle systemic uncertainty, and
whomobilised a wide range of skillsets themselves and in others to
do so. They also focused on the industry's advancement with as
much (if not more) focus than their own farms. Marshall (2015)
cites James, son of Paul Kahl, explaining that his father invested
more time into the development of hybrid organisational forms
than his own cotton growing firm:
James Kahl said his father's recognition of cotton farming's need
for infrastructure and support services saw him focus more
energy and time on helping build the industry in the 1960s andPlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.20191970s than building his family's own farming business interests.
(Marshall, 2015) 9
The first industry firm, established in 1972, was Cotton Australia
(CA). Its purpose was to pool the views of cotton growers in the
Narrabri region, acting as the entity driving advocacy, policy and
strategy development for cotton growers. CA lobbied the Australian
Government for investment in capital infrastructure (e.g., roads,
rail, water) to support the development of the cotton industry.
Unsurprisingly, cotton growers actively participated in activities
organised by CA. Regional cotton grower associations (CGA) were
set up to organise cotton growers by region and these CGAs became
members of CA. CA was formally governed through a Board of Di-
rectors comprised of cotton growers. CA employed staff who were
based in regions and worked closely with CGAs and cotton growers
more generally.
Understanding the importance of R&D to improve cotton
growing operational activities and new cotton technologies, the
boundary spanners developed a second industry firm e the
Australian Cotton Growers Research Association (ACGRA).10 ACGRA
provided strategic direction and funding for R&D projects, and
importantly organised an accounting mechanism around which
individual farmers implicitly contributed to tackling uncertainty
through R&D. ACGRA raised funds from cotton growers through a
voluntary levy on each cotton bale (paid by all cotton growers,
though not compulsory). In doing so, the levy subsequently
increased their vested interests in implementing the recommen-
dations of the resulting cotton R&D projects.
ACGRAalso lobbied theAustralianGovernment for taxpayer funds
to support R&D within the industry. Research projects were funded
by an Australian Government agency called the Cotton Research
Council. As an example, at its meeting on 12 April 1988, the ACGRA
Executive Committee reviewed progress on 32 projects which had
received $1.2m in funding from the Cotton Research Council. A
further 43 new projects were approved and submitted to the Cotton
Research Council with a requested funding amount of $1.5m in total.
Our field data demonstrates the expansion of the remit of the
industry firms. CA initially pooled the views of all firm-level
members, and engaged in regulatory advocacy regarding industry
infrastructure development. The research required to tackle sys-
temic uncertainty drove it to then create a second industry firm,
tasked with performing a strategic research function by identifying
the longer-term systemic uncertainties facing the cotton industry,
driving an agenda of key areas for research to address.
The third industry firm, the Cotton Research and Development
Corporation (CRDC), was created by the Australian Government in
1990 under the Primary Industries and Energy Research and Devel-
opment Act 1989 (Cth). Boundary spanners (founders and other
individuals brought on by the founders to contribute to the in-
dustry firms) and their supporters within the cotton industry lob-
bied to establish this organisation. The minutes of the ACGRA
Executive Committee held on 9 April 1990 document the role
played by boundary spanners and their partners in lobbying:
… meeting be organised at an early date with the Minister for
Primary Industries and Energy to discuss both the role of ACGRA
being the responsible industry firm to which the new R&Dainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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ACGRA members nominating as directors of the new
corporation.
The CRDC was mandated to fund cotton R&D projects using tax
payer funds and to take strategic direction on research from the
ACGRA (and later, CA). We observed an expansion in the breadth of
expertise within this body with the addition of a third industry-
level firm (CRDC) reporting to the second (ACGRA), specifically
sourcing revenue from the government (as opposed to growers)
with a view to broadening the scope of funding for purposes of
tackling systemic uncertainty. We also observed the expansion of
individual cotton grower expertise as they, through ACGRA,
reviewed and assessed R&D proposals which were of a scientific
nature. Further, non-cotton industry stakeholders began to take a
more formal and active role in the resourcing of the cotton industry,
in this instance the Australian Government. We therefore wit-
nessed a gradually wider net of stakeholders adopting an interest in
the cotton industry, incorporating both public (government) and
private (cotton grower) elements.
Finally, the Cotton Cooperative Research Centre (Cotton CRC)
was established in 1993. This was a specialist research partner firm
with responsibility for providing research skills to carry out the
R&D projects funded by the CRDC and approved by ACGRA. The
Cotton CRC brought together 11 core and 36 affiliate research
partners to provide a strong research capability for the cotton in-
dustry. These partners included university-based research teams,
private research firms, and government owned research organisa-
tions. The Cotton CRC conducted its research, development and
extension programme through five streams: farm, catchment,
community, product and adoption.
The industry firms provided a platform for inviting multiple
firms within the cotton industry to collaborate and engage. The role
of committees within the industry firms help to explain how this
collaboration was enabled. The boundary spanners established a
range of industry committees. For example, ACGRA deployed in-
ternal governance committees to bring multiple cotton firms, cot-
ton research firms and other stakeholders together to strategize,
develop strategic activities, assess current performance, and
develop new cotton growing operational activities. A good example
of this internal governance committee and how it was used is
encapsulated by the ACGRA Executive Committee and its related
sub-committees. The Executive Committee was established as the
senior decision-making body of ACGRA; while formal membership
was restricted to cotton growers, other actors (e.g., cotton re-
searchers, agribusiness consultants, etc.) were regularly invited to
attend and contribute to the discussions and decisions. This inter-
mingling of individuals from a diverse range of skillsets allowed
for the “mixing in” of apparently disparate skillsets, rendering
complexity and “impurity” to the pursuit of a solution relating to
the control of cotton pests. In this sense, the industry firm revealed
itself as a hybrid form. The hybrid industry firms were also funded
both publicly by the Government, as well as privately by cotton
growers (based on a levy per bale of cotton). The simultaneous
public-private resourcing of the activities of industry firms strongly
aligns with the notion of a hybrid organisational form.
To specifically evidence the plurality in skillsets marshalled to
achieve its core purpose around managing cotton pests, we explain
the activities of the Transgenic and Insect Management Strategy
(TIMS) Committee and the subsequent introduction of transgenic11 Transgenic cotton is genetically modified cotton which has higher resistance to
cotton pests and is now used widely within the industry.
Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
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established for TIMS Committee were: to design a management
strategy to preserve current and future insect management sys-
tems; to correct/change the insect resistance management strategy
in accordance with conditions such as chemical shortages or
exceptional Heliothis problems; and to “police” the application of
the strategy and provide approvals for deviations it.
The committee membership was broad and multifaceted,
comprising individuals from a highly diverse set of professional
backgrounds which was ultimately key to the attainment of their
objectives. It comprised five cotton growers from ACGRA, three
cotton researchers, one representative from a global bio-
technology firm, two representatives from Cotton Seed Distribu-
tors (CSD), a specialist provider of cotton seed, one representative
from the Queensland Department of Primary Industry, one cotton
agribusiness consultant, and one chemical company representative.
The committee was chaired by a cotton grower who was also a
member of the ACGRA Executive Committee. From its inception,
the focus of the TIMS Committee was on a collaborative, interdis-
ciplinary pursuit towards the development of transgenic cotton,
involving a “negotiated consensus”:
It took a couple of meetings convened by ACGRA, and the organ-
isationalmembership of the committeewas determined, what its
scopewould be andwhat itwould do and off itwent… Thatwas a
pretty big thing for the industry to dobut it needed broad support.
So that's where the kind of industry committee evolved, so it
wasn't CottonAustraliaorCRDCtellingeveryonewhat todo, itwas
broad e so the committee tries to operate through negotiated
consensus. (Cotton Agribusiness Consultant 1)
The industry firms and related committees (internal and in-
dustry) therefore provided cotton growers within CA and ACGRA
the ability to draw upon a wide array of skills from stakeholders to
address the multifaceted challenges posed by the systemic uncer-
tainty, fundamentally requiring a hybrid form (Miller et al., 2008).
The membership driven, not-for-profit cooperative ownership
structure of CA and ACGRA in pursuit of solutions for profit-seeking
firm-level participant members (cotton growers) also reveal the
central tenets of a hybrid form (Doherty et al., 2014; Menard, 2004;
Valentinov, 2004). Finally, the simultaneous role of government
ownership and private sector influence in the CRDC and the Cotton
CRC, alongside the public dissemination of R&D innovations
(Ciesielska, 2010), provide additional characteristics of hybrids.
We emphasise the critical nature of these hybrid elements for
addressing the systemic uncertaintyconcerns. First, tackling systemic
uncertainty from multiple perspectives required multifaceted skills
(boundary spanners) and governance structures to embrace this di-
versity in skills that are non-traditional. Second, the “buying in” and
voluntary participation of members at the industry-level required
accounting systems (voluntary levy) that encouraged the resourcing
of activitieswithin the hybrid formswhile simultaneously raising the
likelihood that all firm-level participants will implement the R&D
resulting from these investments. The R&D outcomes were made
publicly available in an open sourcemanner to further the likelihood
that all participantswill implement them. This is highly characteristic
of a hybrid form (Thomasson, 2009).
Finally, industry firms afforded opportunities to cotton growers
that were not involved in their governance structures to identify
with the issues and challenges arising from the systemic uncer-
tainty through another internal interaction mechanism e the bi-
annual cotton conference. This conference provided a forum for
all cotton growers and researchers to share information on research
project findings, discuss specific ecological challenges, and oper-
ationalise research outcomes, enabling collaboration betweenainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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Cotton conferences in Australia have been an instrument used to
overcome geographical and social challenges by bringing com-
munities together, sharing ideas and research, and uniting
growers. Conferences became a showcase for local research and
became a key resource for both early adopters and prospective
growers. It was also used to address industry-wide matters. (A
historical geography of cotton farming in NSW and QLD:
Adaptation and adoption:15)
4.4. Hybrid industry control processes
The unique resource dependence we observed in our setting
drove the conduct of boundary spanners (key founders), who saw
benefit in acting beyond their own firm-level in order to maximise
their own outcomes. This led to low tension between their firm-
level and inter-firm level pursuits. Having formed the hybrid
organisational forms, activities needed to be organised and con-
ducted in order to tackle the systemic uncertainty. These activities
by the four industry firms yielded a range of industry-level control
processes. For the purposes of our study, we focus on three hybrid
control processes that significantly shaped the design and imple-
mentation of a solution to the systemic uncertainty posed by cotton
pests. In doing so, we speak to a broader theoretical significance of
the study e explaining the role of boundary spanners in yielding
hybrid organisational forms that release hybrid control processes
for purposes of solving a systemic uncertainty.
We investigate how hybrid control processes contributed to the
appraisal, resolution and communication of solutions to firm-level
participants. Specifically, the Environmental Audit was designed to
appraise the extent of the systemic uncertainty from the activities
of the cotton pests and related cotton growing activities of cotton
growers; the R&D facilitation activities labelled “The Program”
contributed to resolving the problem by offering a system for
mobilising the development of new information and resulting
cotton growing processes. Finally, from the program, “Best Man-
agement Practices” (BMP) guidelines were publicly disseminated
from the inter-firm level to the firm-level in order to improve
cotton growing across the industry and better manage the systemic
uncertainty.
4.5. Hybrid industry control processes: the environmental audit
A key activity undertaken by CA was the development of an
industry-wide performance appraisal mechanism, known as the
Environmental Audit (the audit), to assess the current cotton
growing performance in greater detail. The audit was designed to
“identify major environmental issues relating to the Australian
cotton industry and to assess the overall performance of the in-
dustry with respect to these issues” (Gibb, 1991, p. 1).
The audit surveyed all cotton growers, cotton researchers and
other relevant stakeholders. Archival records and interviews with
growers, researchers and other stakeholders were used to collect
data on cotton growing processes and their impacts on the envi-
ronment and on the economic performance of cotton growing
firms. The audit led to 69 key recommendations covering a range of
cotton growing activities including the use and storage of pesti-
cides, the management of land, the use and conservation of water,
as well as the growing, harvesting and processing of cotton.
The audit was a voluntary survey of all key stakeholders and
widely considered the first of its kind globally. Further, it was
developed by multiple public and private stakeholders. CA, with
the assistance of private agri-business consultants and researchersPlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
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Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), developed the survey to
be administered to all target participants industry-wide. Second, it
was administered not only to cotton growers, but also to re-
searchers and consultants, to capture the breadth of challenges
inherent in managing the issues related to the systemic uncer-
tainty. Finally, the audit was administered voluntarily by partici-
pants, which is uncharacteristic of an “audit”, and was completed
by the majority of target participants owing to its criticality.
In the early 1990's, around the time of the audit and prior to
developing new information for improved cotton growing, the
extensive use of pesticides was directly contributing to the creation
of systemic uncertainty e the growth of more pesticide resistant
pests. Understanding how the problem might be tackled required
an appraisal of current grower and researcher/consultant activities,
and all stakeholders appreciated its importance.
Cotton's response to mounting pressure in the late 1980s and
early 1990s was to commission the now historical Environ-
mental Audit in 1991. Addressing its findings… provides a focus
for solid foundation for best practice. The means by which the
cotton industry will steer itself through the increasing political
and environmental pressures is by adhering strictly to an in-
dustry code of practice or best practice guidelines (CA Annual
Report, 1992: p5-refer Appendix 2).
CA lacked knowledge and information on the specific impacts of
chemicals on the cotton farming environment and on surrounding
riverine and other ecosystems, including their impact on beneficial
insects. This information had to be developed collaboratively and
with the active involvement of cotton growers, researchers and
consultants. The in-depth analysis of audit data revealed that in
many instances the actual effects of current cotton growing activ-
ities on the external environment were not known and more in-
formation through R&D was needed to understand these effects.
Theoretically, the attributes of hybrids are observed in theworkings
of the audit. Through its novelty, unexpected methodology and
presence of a diversified public/private stakeholder base, the audit
exhibited the characteristics of a hybrid control process.
4.6. Hybrid industry control processes: project management system
e ‘the program’
Armed with information on knowledge gaps, boundary span-
ners turned to R&D facilitation processes to develop new knowl-
edge that could improve cotton growing. This necessitated the
implementation of control processes to facilitate the conduct of
R&D. Accounting research has documented the role of R&D facili-
tation processes in “controlling” the conduct of R&D and innovation
pursuits of different types of firms (Abernethy & Brownell, 1997;
Bisbe&Otley, 2004; Chenhall, Kallunki,& Silvola, 2011; Revellino&
Mouritsen, 2009). These studies identify a range of control pro-
cesses such as personnel controls, planning, performance mea-
surement, budgeting and other administrative functions as
enabling and facilitating R&D processes to develop new informa-
tion. However, settings such as Intel (Miller et al., 2008; Miller &
O'Leary, 2007) were characterised by the conduct of R&D at the
firm-level. We explain how the project management system in our
setting acted as a hybrid control process, driving an approach to
tackling R&D at the inter-firm level, subsequently leading to the
identification of systemic uncertainty solutions.
An example of a structured R&D facilitation process was the
project management system implemented to facilitate the planning
and development of processes surrounding the Helicoverpa pesti-
cide resistance R&D Program, known simply as ‘The Program’.ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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iours of key individuals partaking in the R&D process through a
series of program objectives, key activities and monitoring of ac-
tivities against these objectives (Revellino & Mouritsen, 2009). The
Program became a key focus of ACGRA's efforts to use R&D to
develop new information for improved pesticide resistant cotton
growing. Structured as a 5-year process with multiple smaller
projects, The Program brought together cotton researchers and
cotton growers to collaborate and develop new knowledge and
information that yielded improved cotton growing processes.
A sophisticated project management system (PMS) was devel-
oped and implemented to facilitate all aspects of The Program. This
PMS had a number of important features. First, a committee was
established to manage The Program. The committee were respon-
sible for setting the objectives of The Program, agreeing on R&D
priorities, designing the research program (including phases and
research projects), and the financial and operational management
of The Program. Strategic direction was established based on three
objectives:
1. Assess the impact, if any, of current pesticide use on the riverine
environment.
2. Develop practical and economic methods to minimise the
transport of pesticides from application sites (i.e., cotton farms)
and to minimise their effects on the riverine environment.
3. Provide a sound scientific basis for the development of man-
agement guidelines and regulatory codes for cotton growers.
Second, the committee comprised a wide range of stakeholders,
including public bodies such as the government owned CRDC and
other stakeholders both within and outside of the cotton industry,
including sectors such as water resources and irrigation. A cotton
grower who was involved with a number of firms and forums
within the cotton industry described The Program as a:
… huge cooperative venture involving research funders, a range
of research providers and the cotton industry. Progress is usually
achieved through cooperative effort and this program has
highlighted such benefit.
Third, the committee established the direction which was
embedded in the three strategic objectives set for The Program.
Highlighting the importance of systemic uncertainty and related
issues (e.g., pesticide resistance) and prior industry-wide in-
adequacies in responding to this threat, a cotton grower from a
major private cotton grower firm described it as follows:
The Australian cotton industry, perhaps more than any other
agricultural enterprise, has been at the epicentre of tension
over agricultural practice. Clearly, the use of chemicals and
concern for the riverine environment has been key pressure
triggers.
Fourth, the PMS established specific performance outcomes that
were communicated to all stakeholders and operated as a mea-
surement control to manage the performance of The Program.
These performance outcomes were developed for The Program as a
whole and for each Phase, used to focus and influence managerial
behaviour to achieve the strategic direction. The performance
outcomes for The Program overall included the identification of all
impacts of operational activities in relation to pesticides on the
riverine and aquatic ecosystems, and the development of improved
operational activities to reduce the environmental footprint of
cotton growers. These performance outcomes helped to focus thePlease cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
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helping to change operating processes, as described by one cotton
grower:
… best practices provide a process for benchmarking and where
necessary methodical and rational change in management sys-
tems. It also provides a vehicle for cultural change.
Finally, the R&D facilitation efforts were largely considered
successful, as they led to the conduct of research that was inte-
grative and collaborative, strongly involving cotton growers in the
process:
… we were blessed by researchers that didn't just sit at the
research station and do their research and publish papers …
These were guys that went out into the fields and spoke to
farmers (cotton growers), got feedback… there was always very
much a working relationship, certainly a core of the really
respected researchers … they have these relationships with
growers where theywill just ring them direct and say, I have got
this bug (cotton pest), what is it or how do I manage it or
whatever … the industry was also very blessed in having very,
very good researchers … it had a very positive sense about the
value of research … there was real tangible successes … from
investing in the research. (CC3)
Theoretically, the Program revealed attributes aligning it to a
hybrid control process. More generally, it was developed to regulate
industry-level knowledge development at the inter-firm (industry-
level), and required the coordination of multi-faceted skillsets to
develop an inter-firm solution. These two attributes of hybrids
reveal themselves through this control process.
4.7. Hybrid industry control processes: best management practice
(BMP)
Best Management Practice (BMP) is best described as an
industry-level management control process.12 Theoretically, BMP
might also be regarded as a hybrid process (Miller et al., 2008) as it
represents the universal and public dissemination of a set of ac-
tivities from the inter-firm level to the firm-level, and was also
developed from R&D projects identified and funded by the CRDC
and CRC (government bodies) for a profit motive (the continuing
profitability of individual cotton grower operations). Its tran-
scending from inter-firm to firm-level as well as its public funding
links to private industry benefits characterises it as a hybrid control
process. All cotton growers were afforded access to the BMP, and
indeed, they were made public in broader research forums to
maximise their reach, though funded in part by the private con-
tributions of cotton growers through the cotton bale levy ($2.00 per
bale).
BMP is a solutions implementation tool deployed by CA to
directly influence the behaviours of farmers with a view to over-
coming a key systemic uncertainty (pest resistance), thereby
attaining the longer-term objectives of the industry. BMP relies on a
set of management accounting activities (benchmarking and targetdecision maker(s).
ainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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& Brown, 2008; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012) that provide
information on improved aspects of cotton growing to tackle pes-
ticides. In our setting, it enabled individual firms to benchmark
their current operational activities and identify the improvements
required, providing a:
… process for benchmarking and where necessary methodical
and rational change in management systems and a basis for
cultural change. (Boundary Spanner, Pesticide Conference
address, 1998)
This approach was recommended by external consultants who
reviewed the work undertaken by the industry research projects
(e.g., The Program):
Emphasis should be shifted to supporting Phase 2 of the research
program, i.e., to identify and test potential methods for amelio-
rating problems by supporting proposals for… development of a
comprehensive Best Management Research Project … a Best
Management Practices Manual should be developed for use by
growers and consultants (CRHarris, University ofGuelph, Ontario,
Canada, Independent Program Review, Jan 1996:4).
The adoption of BMP was organised by managers at CA who
helped train and communicate them to growers, helped themwith
the assessment of their current activities, and helped them plan for
changes to activities not in line with BMP. A cotton agribusiness
consultant who was involved in this process described how these
teams from CA helped growers:
Cotton Australia had a team of people trying to get them to
adopt it … So, the sorts of things that happened, from memory
back then, were Cotton Australia people getting the growers to
do the rankings and self-assessments and do things. (Cotton
Agribusiness Consultant)
The first version of the BMP was released as a 70-page, hard
copy manual in 1996 grouped under four major headings: farm
design and management, pesticide application, integrated pest
management (IPM), and pesticide storage and handling. The focus
of the BMPmanual was on three key issues: how the BMP should be
used, how growers should be engaged to enable adoption of best
practices, and how compliance to best practices should be moni-
tored. The focus was to ensure that the:
Manual really is a manual … that is something that is used (not
just read), as the word manual implies. (Cotton Consultant 3,
Pesticide conference presentation, 1998)
The BMP manual first required growers to conduct a self-
assessment of their individual operational activities. Self-
assessment worksheets with a series of questions were included
for each category, which allowed the grower to assess their prac-
tices and identify risks. The use of risk ratings (from 1 e low risk, to
4 e extreme risk) allowed the grower to identify high priority areas
within their activities that required action plans to enable im-
provements to be made.
Second, for critical issues identified in high risk (3e4 rating)
categories, the BMP Manual provided another framework. This
framework took the form of hazard identification and analysis, and
led to a specific set of activities tailored for a farm that could be
implemented incrementally by the grower. Rather than design a
prescriptive set of processes, the grower is able to develop:Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019… their own best management practices and to check them
against some standard issues included in the Manual … [This
process] alerts people to key issues and potential problems
while allowing them to develop a set of practices with accom-
panying monitoring systems which suit their specific circum-
stances and operations. (Cotton Consultant 3-Pesticide
conference presentation, 1998)
On-farm environmental outcomes have been significantly
improved by the adoption of BMP, directly improving grower
management of the systemic uncertainty e the threat of pests and
pest resistance:
[They] have played a role in the reduction in the use of pesticides
on-farmand thesignificant increase in the level of professionalism
in pesticide application… the result has been a reduction in total
sprays, a reduction in the occasionswhen sprays have not reached
the target pest and/or weed, and a reduction in the number of
odour and spray drift complaints about spraying practices on-
farm. (Macarthur Agribusiness, 2004:1)5. Discussion
Global challenges can be multifaceted and complex (IPCC,
2014; Uetake, 2015), creating systemic uncertainty impacting
many if not all firms in an industry (Tashman & Rivera, 2016). The
antecedents to and operation of management control systems at
the interfirm-level to address systemic uncertainty remain less
understood in accounting research (Caglio& Ditillo, 2008; Dekker,
2016).
Cotton pests pose a critical strategic threat to the cotton industry
in Australia (Fitt, 1994), and indirectly, the broader Australian
economy through its impacts on other cotton dependent industries.
In our case, cotton firms and cotton growers were also faced with
the reality that no single grower possessed the requisite financial
resources or intellectual capital or know-how to construct a dura-
ble solution to the cotton pest problem. Further, even if one did
(and none could), the execution of the solution required universal
implementation by cotton firms to prevent a recurrence of the
systemic uncertainty (cotton pests).
The lack of a dominant partner and the inability of any indi-
vidual firm to resource and subsequently solve the problem alone
are key differentiating aspects in our context e this provides the
basis for novel explanations regarding our development of inter-
firm relationships when compared to other inter-firm control
studies, such as the Intel studies by Miller and O'Leary (2005a,
2005b, 2007). The important consideration subsequently for cotton
firms was not if they needed to collaborate but how they coordi-
nated their activities to develop new industry-level structures and
processes tomanage themultifaceted, systemic uncertainty created
by cotton pests. We observed key individuals transcending their
firm-level responsibilities to develop industry bodies (hybrid
forms) and a series of novel, industry-level activities (hybrid control
processes) to effect a control solution, disseminated to firms who
wholly implemented the solution.
While organisations may respond as a collective in a number of
different ways, we offer a novel explanation of multi-firm collab-
oration not discussed to date in the accounting literature. We use a
theoretical lens relating to a less investigated resource dependence
form (low power imbalance, high mutual dependence) described
by Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), that is becoming increasingly
prevalent in the face of industry-wide challenges faced by different
sectors. Using this theoretical lens, we explain how hybrid formsainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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uncertainty, and the importance of the low tension among
boundary spanners driving the development of hybrids at the inter-
firm level. These will be expanded upon to clarify our two primary
contributions.
Using this novel resource dependence combination, our first
contribution is to theoretically broaden the range of character-
istics encapsulating hybrids in order to explain how hybrid
organisational forms and hybrid control processes interact. Hy-
brids are dominantly regarded as possessing novel arrangements
existing at an inter-firm level in management accounting research
(Miller et al., 2008). How different hybrids interact with one
another remain less explored in extant accounting studies. We
explain how, by mobilising a broader conceptualisation of hy-
brids in accounting literature to acknowledge the potential
public/private (Thomasson, 2009) and open source (Ciesielska,
2010) attributes of hybrids, previously not discussed in ac-
counting studies. These broader conceptualisations were crucial
to enabling the working of our hybrid relationships. The public/
private hybrid attribute clarifies how hybrid forms were
resourced, with public sector involvement necessitated by the
economic importance of the cotton industry and driving gov-
ernment support financially, then gradually expanding to include
a wider range of resources and subsequent ownership of some
hybrid organisational forms. This gradual widening of participa-
tion by government across a series of hybrid forms at the
industry-level to support firm-level outcomes in the industry is
less documented in the literature. From an industry perspective,
the substantial investment put forward by cotton farms (firms),
via the cotton bale levy, is a considerable investment into R&D,
whose solutions are not privatised by the industry but made
open to all (open source) owing to the industry-wide imple-
mentation required to counter systemic uncertainty.
Our second contribution is to mobilise the resource depen-
dence view to explain how the less cited inverse relation between
boundary spanner tension and inter-firm collaboration (Anderson
& Dekker, 2014; Coletti et al., 2005; Dekker, 2016) arises in our
setting. We note that the lack of tension between the firm-level
and inter-firm activities of key individuals (boundary spanners)
as a result of the unique resource dependence combination drove
their efforts to work together and mobilise inter-firm activities
that were beneficial to all participants beyond their own firms.
When faced with systemic uncertainty that no individual firm
could overcome, key individuals in firms transcended to conduct
industry-level work to mobilise the industry, required to resolve
firm-level problems. There is therefore little tension between
their industry-level work and their firm-level work. The lower
tension observed in our setting has been discussed less in the
literature, as the dominant dyadic inter-firm research (Dekker,
2016) is characterised by adversarial relations between partners,
leading to boundary spanner tension (Levina & Vaast, 2005). Our
findings contrast Levina and Vaast (2005), explaining the capacity
for boundary spanners to mobilise inter-firm behaviours
constructively in ways that reinforce all participants in the
collaboration. In doing so, we provide valuable evidence
advancing Dekker’s (2016) call for studies clarifying how inter-
firm management controls operate beyond dyadic relationships,
in parity-based (low power imbalance) environments. Parity-
based relationships, such as that observed in this setting, have
been called for more concertedly in extant accounting research
(Caglio & Ditillo, 2008).
Over time, the Australian cotton industry collectively managed
the systemic uncertainty arising from the activities of cotton pests.
This transformation is eloquently captured in the comments of a
cotton agribusiness consultant:Please cite this article as: Thambar, P. J et al., Managing systemic uncert
Accounting, Organizations and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019If I was to be able to take us to a field of cotton, even in 1992,
let alone 1982, really only the plants would be recognisable
today. The way we grow the crops changed, the way it's pro-
tected from insects has changed. The way it is watered has sort
of changed to a large degree. The way it is picked has changed. It
is amazing really and yet I don't know that anyone necessarily
stood there in '92 or '82 and said, this is what we want to see,
this is what we'd like.
An outline of the boundary spanners, hybrid organisational
forms and hybrid control processes that emerged in our setting is
provided in Table 1.
Finally, and more empirically, we also provide insights into the
operations of management controls in an agricultural setting, a
setting which has received less attention in the management ac-
counting and control literature (Argiles & Slof, 2001; Jack, 2005)
but which is widely expected to grow in importance as broader
factors surrounding population growth and food security intensify.
Contextually, the continual threat of pests and pesticide resistance
to all agricultural producers, not just cotton, will require industry-
level responses beyond that which can be tackled by any one pro-
ducer or other stakeholder. To this extent, our findings add to in-
dustry specific understanding of the role of inter-firm controls to
address these threats (Messner, 2016).6. Conclusion
Understanding how multiple firms (beyond a dyad) collaborate
and carry out industry-level collaborations to manage systemic
uncertainty remains less studied in the inter-firm management
control literature (Caglio&Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2016).We develop
knowledge on how multiple firms coordinate activities to manage
systemic uncertainty. We do this by highlighting the importance of
boundary spanner behaviour in the absence of tensions, and its
consequent effects on hybrid forms and hybrid control processes in
this industry-level venture. First, we explain how boundary span-
ners engage in industry-level efforts to mobilise private and public
resourcing of hybrid organisational forms as a platform fromwhich
to deploy hybrid industry-level management control processes.
These control processes appraise, solve and distribute solutions so
that systemic uncertainty at the firm-level is managed while
achieving broader industry-level objectives. These industry-level
management controls (Environmental Audit, R&D facilitation ini-
tiatives, and BMP) were developed to function as coordinating
mechanisms to enable collaboration between firms and to develop
information which firms can use to manage systemic uncertainty.
Moving forward, our study might be extended to the obser-
vation of other types of hybrid elements. We did not observe
hybrid practices in our study, but only hybrid organisational
forms and hybrid control processes. Indeed, the distinction be-
tween hybrid practices and hybrid control processes (Miller
et al., 2008) remains less understood, and we explained that
our data related more closely to processes than practices. Studies
that elaborate on these and their inter-linkage to the operation
of controls in other industries will further add to our under-
standing in this space (Messner, 2016). What types of controls
exist, and how they are developed and used, will help build a
more coherent understanding of strategic responses by firms
faced with systemic uncertainty beyond the cotton agricultural
setting.
As previously stated, we also found and analysed a particular
combination of hybrid elements. Perhaps such interactions mani-
fest differently in other settings, when influenced by theoretical
impetus other than resource dependence borne from systemicainty: The role of industry-level management controls and hybrids,
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firm and industry-levels will aid in shedding greater light on how
hybrids impact the mobilisation of controls in inter-firm settings.
We acknowledge limitations in our field study. First, the findings
from a single industry-level case may be less relevant to other
settings. The characteristics of industry-level management controls
and hybrid organisational forms examined might manifest differ-
ently in other settings and further research on these issues in
different settings will prove useful. More research on how firms
manage systemic uncertainties and what different strategic re-
sponses are usefully made to manage these uncertainties in alter-
native settings will build a more coherent understanding of the
hybrid-control interrelation. Second, studies applying more
aggregated data from a wider range of firm settings will supple-
ment the in-depth findings from a single case that our study has
provided. Third, our in-depth case could not consider the evidence
of every single individual exhibiting boundary spanner behaviour
and we also concede that other management control processes not
highlighted to us in the field may exist, which might exhibit hybrid
attributes. Despite these limitations, our study makes an important
contribution to our understanding of how hybrids interrelate toStage Interviewee
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Face to face Taped 1 h
Face to face Taped 1 h
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